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ABSTRACT 
 
Terrorism researchers have long sought to identify methods for challenging terrorist ideologies. 
The construction and dissemination of counternarratives has begun to receive substantial 
attention as a means of doing so. However, the effectiveness of this approach is contingent on 
message targets’ trust in the counternarrative’s content and source. This article draws from 
literatures on trust and online source credibility to offer preliminary guidelines for cultivating 
trust in counternarratives and their sources. By encouraging trust in this manner, practitioners 
can reduce the likelihood that their counternarratives will be dismissed by their intended 
audiences—a perpetual challenge to strategic messaging geared towards countering violent 
extremism.  
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Cultivating Trust and Source Credibility in Online Counternarratives Intended to 
Reduce Support for Terrorism 
 
In December of 2013, the U.S. Department of State launched the English-language version of 
its attempt at online counter-radicalization messaging.1 This program, called ‘Think Again, 
Turn Away,’ was developed by the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC) and was intended to counter ISIS propaganda by sharing stories and 
images that challenge ISIS claims and ideology. Counter-messages disseminated by CSCC 
personnel were largely taken from the media in the form of stories that highlight the mortal and 
social threats posed by ISIS, as well as videos produced to demonstrate the brutality of the 
group. Though the CSCC’s efforts were a well-intentioned first step in leveraging counter-
messaging strategies online, the execution of the campaign was largely a failure. Stories posted 
to Twitter devolved into ‘embarrassing’ online arguments between the CSCC and ISIS 
supporters2; messages were lampooned by the groups they were meant to challenge; and even 
CSCC officials grew ‘supremely uncomfortable’ about sending out counter-messages with the 
Department of State seal attached to them.3 Although the State Department has since revamped 
and improved its online counter-messaging strategies, its first counternarrative efforts were, at 
best, unsuccessful. 
 
As illustrated by ‘Think Again, Turn Away,’ one of the key challenges facing efforts to 
implement effective counter-messaging campaigns is the difficulty associated with audience 
distrust in message content and sources. If the source of a message is perceived as 
untrustworthy, target audiences may dismiss their messages, or worse, engage in behaviours 
opposite to those advocated. Some researchers have begun to recognize the importance of 
source credibility in counter-messaging. To illustrate, Braddock and Horgan 4  recently 
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developed a preliminary framework for constructing and disseminating counternarratives—
narratives that discourage engagement in terrorism by challenging the themes that underpin 
terrorist messages. In their paper, they suggested a set of actionable procedures grounded in 
communication and psychology theory. In discussing these procedures, Braddock and Horgan 
emphasised the importance of ‘cultivating trust’ between counternarrative targets and those 
perceived as the source of the counternarrative message.5 The authors essentially argued that a 
counternarrative’s content is moot if the message recipient did not consider its source to be 
legitimate and trustworthy. Without this trust, they contended, the counternarrative is likely to 
be ignored or deemed illegitimate. We seek to provide insight into how these negative 
outcomes can be avoided by (a) expanding on the role of trust in the use of narratives and 
counternarratives and (b) providing researchers, practitioners, and policymakers with 
actionable suggestions for engendering trust in a counternarrative’s source, and by extension, 
its content. 
 
More specifically, this article assesses our understanding of the role of trust in two stages in 
Horgan’s6 ‘arc’ of terrorism: initial terrorist involvement and disengagement. To do so, we 
discuss how terrorists cultivate trust in their narrative propaganda to improve its effectiveness 
and how trust in a counternarrative’s source and content contributes to one’s movement away 
from terrorism. This is followed by an appraisal of the related issue of source credibility of 
online communication. The discussion of online source credibility draws from Sundar’s MAIN 
Model, 7 which identifies content-specific and structural characteristics of online messages that 
influence the degree to which users attribute credibility to the source of those messages. By 
integrating these two complementary areas of research, this article will demonstrate the role of 
trust in counternarrative effectiveness. Insight gained from the analysis of these research areas 
are then utilised to achieve the article’s goal of offering actionable suggestions for increasing 
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the counternarrative target’s trust in the message, as well as the credibility of the message’s 
source. 
Trust 
Diego Gambetta defined trust as ‘a particular level of the subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before 
he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and 
in a context in which it affects his own action’8. The ‘particular action’ referred to by Gambetta 
can relate to a range of possible activities. Included within this is the assessment that an agent 
will distribute legitimate and reliable information concerning a specific topic. This article seeks 
to address whether and how it is possible for practitioners to achieve trust in their 
counternarratives such that their targets accept them (and their perceived sources) as 
trustworthy.  
 
Before turning to the discussion of terrorism and trust, however, it is important to note that 
trust can take many forms. Seligman9 asserted that an individual can have abstract trust in a 
system or principle (e.g., trust in democracy), functional trust in practical relationships with 
others (e.g., trust in a lawyer to defend you), and/or personal trust in relationships that exceed 
pragmatic outcomes (e.g., trust in a friend). Seligman’s notion of personal trust is like 
Rathbun’s10 moralistic trust, which is based on an individual’s dependability. Rathbun11 has 
discussed the concept of generalized trust, which refers to a person’s expectations of societal 
norms and the likelihood that others will conform to their beliefs and/or behaviors. Each of 
these forms of trust are relevant to processes related to radicalization and terrorism, so it is 
important to recognize how trust affects these processes. The next section features a discussion 
of this relationship. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Terrorism and Trust 
Before assessing the relationship between trust and counternarratives, it is first necessary to 
understand the role that trust plays in the psychology of terrorist engagement. Trust plays a 
critical role in the decision-making processes across a terrorist’s ‘career’ and is a central 
element of each stage of Horgan’s12 Involvement, Engagement, and Disengagement (IED) arc 
model.13 This section outlines how trust affects the stages of this arc, with particular emphases 
on the processes of initial involvement (Stage 1) and disengagement (Stage 3). 
 
Initial Involvement and Disengagement 
Initial Involvement 
Much of the existing literature on why and how a person joins a terrorist group focuses on the 
concept of violent radicalisation a ‘social and psychological process of incrementally 
experienced commitment to an extremist political or religious ideology’ such that an individual 
is at increased risk for engaging in violence14. For many researchers, this is a precursor to 
involvement with a terrorist group, and is the most critical phase of one’s engagement in 
terrorist activity15. However, exalting the process of violent radicalisation at the expense of 
other factors limits our understanding of the conditions necessary for an individual’s 
engagement in terrorism.16 It is necessary to expand the scope of extant analyses to understand 
the process by which an individual becomes initially involved with a terrorist group. A 
significant part of this process may be influenced by an individual’s trust and/or distrust of 
salient entities. A significant amount of research on terrorism has drawn conclusions to this 
effect. 
 
For example, in her analysis of terrorism and trust in Northern Ireland, Fierke17 highlighted 
how the 1972 Bloody Sunday killings cultivated widespread distrust of the British Government 
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and its security forces among the Irish nationalist and republican populations. The general 
distrust of the British Government strengthened trust in the Provisional IRA (PIRA) to protect 
the republican communities. In this way, Bloody Sunday served as the most effective 
recruitment tool for the PIRA in some of the most contentious years of the Troubles. 
 
In the wake of Bloody Sunday, the process of radicalisation (as conceptualised by many 
terrorism researchers) did not guide the rationale behind an individual’s membership in the 
PIRA. Movement towards (and subsequent membership in) the PIRA did not require 
ideological commitment or transformation. Many joined the group not to fight for a united 
Ireland, but to protect against what they perceived to be threats to their community. These 
individuals placed functional trust in the PIRA to successfully provide this defence. 
 
Although past research on trust and terrorism has not emphasised the process of violent 
radicalisation, one should not dismiss trust’s role with respect to an individual’s initial 
engagement with a terrorist group. For instance, Hegghammer18 contended that when a terrorist 
is recruited, there is a ‘trust game’ between the recruiter and the potential recruit. Related to 
this, Morrison19 contended that a potential recruit must have functional trust in the group if 
recruitment is to be successful. This functional trust need not be related to the organisation’s 
ultimate objective, but to that which they require of the group more immediately (e.g., defence 
against another group, the thrill of engaging in dangerous activities). It is also important for the 
existing membership of the group to trust their potential new comrade. Recruiters must trust 
that new recruits are ideologically committed and will not risk the security of the existing 
network. 
 
Disengagement 
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In the final phase of Horgan’s20 arc model, individuals undergo a process of psychological 
and/or physical disengagement. Psychological disengagement (referred to by some as 
deradicalisation) is a process of belief and/or attitude change whereby an individual no longer 
adheres to his former group’s ideology. Physical disengagement relates to the stoppage of 
terrorist activity.21 It is important to note that physical disengagement can occur in the absence 
of psychological disengagement, and psychological disengagement can occur without the 
individual physically disengaging.  
 
As with the initial involvement phase, trust plays a key role in the process of psychological 
disengagement. At the very heart of an individual’s psychological disengagement is a 
deterioration of abstract trust in the terrorist group’s ideology and justifications for engaging 
in violence. This deterioration can occur for a variety of internal and/or external factors that 
lead to an individual’s questioning their group’s ideology and legitimacy.  
 
Related to this, a recent meta-analysis assessed why individuals psychologically disengage 
from terrorist groups.22 Of the thirteen reasons identified in the analysis, eight can be linked 
with the dichotomous theme of trust/distrust: 
• Mistreatment 
• Ideological Differences 
• Differences in Tactical Preferences 
• Differences in Strategic Preferences 
• Disillusionment with Group Hypocrisy 
• Unmet Expectations 
• Cognitive Dissonance 
• Loss of Social Support 
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A cursory assessment of these factors shows that they are intrinsically related to deterioration 
in functional, abstract, moralistic, or personal trust. Consider, for example that mistreatment 
can weaken an individual’s personal trust of a group and its other members. Differences in 
strategic and/or tactical preferences, unmet expectations, and a loss of support can damage an 
individual’s functional trust in his group. Ideological differences, group hypocrisy, and 
cognitive dissonance can deteriorate an individual’s abstract trust. Finally, a person’s 
moralistic trust can wane if their ideological purity or strategic adherence is called into 
question.23 
 
Horgan24 explained that among other factors, psychological disengagement from a terrorist 
group can be catalysed by feelings of disillusionment developed from an imbalance between 
an individual’s lofty expectations about the group’s operations and their experienced reality of 
involvement. In short, the weakening of the terrorist group’s credibility can prompt feelings of 
disappointment and disillusionment with the group. Consider, for example, the case of Omar 
Nasiri, a former member of al-Qaeda. In an account of his life as an al-Qaeda operative, Nasiri 
described an interaction with London-based operative, Abu Hamza: 
 
Hamza asked me which of the camps in Afghanistan I had been in, and I 
told him. Then I leant forward slightly. ‘I met someone you know,’ I said in 
a conspiratorial voice. Hamza raised his brow just slightly. ‘I trained with 
Assad Allah,’ I told him. ‘He told me about the nitroglycerine, and how you 
lost your hands.’ Hamza looked away. ‘Brother,’ he whispered, not meeting 
my gaze, ‘please don’t share that story with anyone.’ As I was to learn later, 
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Hamza claimed he had lost his hands defusing a landmine on the front lines 
in Afghanistan. I knew the real story.25 
 
In presenting this story, Horgan26 demonstrates the extent to which terrorist entities like al-
Qaeda preserve myths to maintain their credibility among potential recruits and current 
members. A loss of that credibility can result in a loss of trust in the group’s leadership and 
ideology, which in turn, can motivate individuals to leave the group. This was the case with 
Omar Nasiri. 
 
Prior to joining a terrorist group, some individuals have idealised notions of its ideological 
purity and tactical capabilities. However, the reality of organisational membership in a terrorist 
group frequently contradicts these idealised notions. An ideological ‘purist’ joining the group 
may become disillusioned after interacting with their new, less-devout comrades. This can 
highlight ideological discrepancies between a group’s external narrative and internal reality. 
For instance, research on al-Qaeda members has shown that individuals have left the group due 
to its interpretation of Islam.27 This manifested as a lack of religiosity among the group’s 
leadership, criminality among its rank-and-file members, and pervasive greed throughout the 
organisation. These attributes contradicted the purified public image that the group has 
historically sought to portray. These ideological differences, coupled with the observable 
hypocrisy associated with acting in contradiction to the organisation’s stated ideals, can lead 
individuals to lose abstract trust in the organisational ideology and the moralistic trust they 
have in their comrades. 
 
These observations relating to the initial involvement and disengagement phases of Horgan’s 
arc model illustrate the importance of trust throughout a terrorist’s career.28 Given its centrality, 
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particularly with respect to disengagement, it is imperative that factors that influence trust are 
considered in any strategy intended to reduce support for terrorism, including the development 
and dissemination of counternarratives.  
 
Unfortunately, terrorism researchers have yet to sufficiently address how trust influences the 
efficacy of counternarratives. Braddock and Horgan’s work suggested the importance of trust 
in the dissemination of counternarratives, but provided little guidance for cultivating that 
trust.29 They argued that a counternarrative’s credibility can be improved by distributing it via 
trusted channels (e.g., trusted community leaders, anonymous online comrades), but did not 
provide specific guidelines on how to utilise these channels or develop counternarrative 
messages that exploit their affordances. 
 
To effectively facilitate distrust in a terrorist group or ideology via counternarratives, it is 
important for the individual to trust the source of any message designed to promote 
disengagement. Failure to deliver counternarrative messages from a trusted source risks having 
the intended target dismiss or argue against the counternarrative. Therefore, it is essential that 
that the vehicle through which counternarratives are delivered is credible with its intended 
audience.  
 
To this end, the remainder of this paper will focus on source credibility and its implications for 
the efficacy of counternarratives. Expanding on the work of Braddock and Horgan and drawing 
from a seminal literature on source credibility from the field of communications, the following 
sections assess how credibility is conveyed to audiences in what has become a modern-day 
‘ground zero’ for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation—the Internet.  
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Credibility and the Internet 
 
The proliferation of the Internet as the world’s principal communication technology has 
afforded terrorist groups the ability to reach individuals to whom they might otherwise lack 
immediate access. Terrorism researchers have long-shown that terrorist groups utilise the 
Internet for communicative, coordinative, and instrumental purposes.30 The utility of both 
traditional Internet technologies (e.g., websites, discussion fora) and Web 2.0 social media 
platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) for accessing potential recruits around the world has 
become strikingly evident with the emergence and recruiting successes of tech-savvy groups 
like ISIS.31 Given the potential for Internet-based technologies to influence and motivate 
recipients of terrorist groups’ messages, it is imperative that those who seek to counter those 
messages consider how Internet-based messages can challenge terrorist narrative propaganda. 
 
To this end, Sundar identified four specific types of affordances that may exert significant 
psychological effects on those that engage with messages on the Internet.32 Although Sundar’s 
explication of these affordances did not speak specifically to terrorism, they refer to the 
structural aspects of Internet-based communication technologies, and as such, can inform 
research on terrorist messaging and counter-messaging in online contexts. These affordances—
modality, agency, interactivity, and navigability—are manifest in most digital media and cue 
heuristics related to judgments about a message source’s credibility.33 As such, these four 
affordances can affect how target audiences will perceive the credibility of the source of 
Internet-based counternarratives.  
 
Internet-based technologies stand as the most salient examples of communication technologies 
for which structural aspects can be varied contingent upon the preferences and goals of message 
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designers. Sundar claimed that the nature of the psychological and behavioural outcomes 
associated with these affordances is largely dependent on how they are manifest within the 
medium itself.34 So, a consideration of how the affordances affect terrorist messaging can 
provide some insight into the nature of the psychological and behavioural effects that can be 
expected among those that encounter terrorist messages. More importantly, a consideration of 
the affordances in the production and dissemination of counternarratives can promote source 
credibility among their distributors, thereby increasing their effectiveness. The following 
sections summarize the four affordance types that comprise Sundar’s MAIN model, as well as 
several associated heuristics that can influence a message’s perceived credibility. Following 
these summaries, we offer a more focused discussion on how these affordances and heuristics 
can influence audiences of counter-terrorist messaging as a function of the trust they cultivate.  
 
The MAIN Model 
Sundar’s MAIN model is based on a long tradition of research showing that the four affordance 
types—modality, agency, interactivity, and navigability—are present to some extent in all 
digital media and prompt ‘significant psychological effects’ in those that engage with them.35 
The manifestations of each affordance can lead to positive or negative assessments concerning 
the credibility of the source of a message and the Internet-based conduit through which it is 
expressed.  
 
The MAIN Model outlines how different affordances manifest in terms of their application, 
design structure, or quantity, each of which can affect an individual’s judgments of a message’s 
source. 36   More specifically, the model shows how modality, agency, interactivity, and 
navigability can cue certain cognitive shortcuts (hereafter, ‘heuristics’) about the credibility of 
a message and its source. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of the MAIN Model. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
To determine how the MAIN Model can be applied to inform the development and 
dissemination of counternarratives, we now turn to the four key affordance types and describe 
how their manifestations can cue certain heuristics. Whereas modality and agency cues relate 
to the content of counternarratives, the interactivity and navigability cues relate to how 
counternarratives are embedded in online interfaces. Both sets of cues are important for the 
effective distribution of counternarratives, as they both influence audience perceptions of 
credibility in relation to those counternarratives, as well as their sources.  
 
For the sake of parsimony, the following sections will offer general descriptions of each 
affordance type before summarising heuristics salient to the development and online 
distribution of counternarratives. 
 
Modality Cues and Associated Heuristics 
 
Modality refers to the method by which a message is delivered. The Internet provides terrorist 
groups with several means with which to disseminate their messages, particularly since the 
emergence and proliferation of Web 2.0 platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and other social 
media technologies have facilitated direct contact between terrorist groups and their audiences. 
As evidenced by the multimedia campaigns launched by groups like ISIS, terrorists and their 
supporters can utilise basic text, photographs, pre-recorded video, live-casting, podcasting, and 
a multitude of other communicative media to reach audiences. Fortunately, it is possible to use 
those same media to disseminate counternarratives intended to challenge terrorist propaganda. 
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Still, the decision to distribute counternarratives online raises questions concerning the 
psychological effects on those that are exposed to them. One of the most pertinent questions to 
be considered in the development and distribution of online counternarratives relates to 
potential heuristics that may be triggered by presenting information via certain modalities and 
whether these heuristics positively or negatively affect perceptions of online counternarrative 
quality or credibility. Table 1 outlines various heuristics associated with modality-based cues, 
as well as the implications of these heuristics as theorized by the MAIN model. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Agency Cues and Associated Heuristics 
 
Identifying sources of online content can be difficult,37 and judgments of content reliability are 
largely dependent on perceptions of its ostensible source. Developers of counternarratives can 
take advantage of this uncertainty by attributing information to ‘particular entities in the chain 
of communication’ to increase user perceptions of message credibility.38 It may also be useful 
for developers of counternarratives to attack the credibility of terrorist narratives suggesting 
their sources are untrustworthy. Before delving into specific methods for leveraging agency 
cues to improve credibility of online counternarrative content and sources intended to challenge 
terrorist narratives, we first outline agency cues and heuristics more generally. Table 2 
summarises various heuristics associated with message sourcing and how they might affect 
perceptions of credibility and trust in online content. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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As with modality-based cues and heuristics, different agency cues will be more central to 
judging the quality and credibility of online content and sources in different contexts. For 
example, the machine heuristic will prompt more favourable judgments about content that 
highlights ‘factual’ information. The social presence heuristic, by comparison, will prompt 
more favourable judgments about content with a socioemotional focus. The unique nature of 
terrorist ideologies as emotion-laden concepts requires a close empirical examination of how 
sourcing affects audience perceptions of the content being presented. These issues will be 
addressed in greater detail below where we offer specific guidelines for analysts and 
practitioners for leveraging agency-related cues and heuristics in the development of online 
counternarrative content. 
 
Interactivity Cues and Associated Heuristics 
 
Perhaps the most obvious outcome associated with the rapid development of digital media is 
the degree to which interactivity has become an integral part of online communication. 
Although there exist several definitions of interactivity, many from before the proliferation of 
the Internet,39 Sundar and colleagues summarised these definitions and brought them to bear 
on the modern nature of digital media.40 They described interactivity as the potential for users 
to be both sources and recipients of content. As outlined above, the emergence and growth of 
Web 2.0 social media platforms has fundamentally changed how we interact with content on 
the Internet. But regardless of changes to the Web and how we engage with it, the basic premise 
of interactivity is constant; it refers to the process by which an individual provides inputs into 
a communication system and receives some form of feedback in return. Sundar’s MAIN Model 
identifies multiple heuristics associated with interactivity that may influence the credibility of 
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terrorist narratives and counternarratives. Table 3 lists a few of these heuristics, as well as their 
implications for the credibility of the content that cues them. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Because interactivity has been conceptualized in several ways, there exist a multitude of 
potential cues and heuristics that relate to it. The sample discussed here represents only a few 
of these heuristics, chosen on the basis of their importance for counternarrative dissemination. 
As digital media evolve, however, the interactive features of computer-mediated 
communication will continue to change. As a result, new cues and heuristics regarding 
perceptions of quality and credibility are likely to emerge. As the technology allows, some 
interactivity-related cues and heuristics will interact with one another. As such, it will be 
critical for developers and distributors of counternarratives to remain abreast of the features 
inherent to these new technologies and what psychological effects they could trigger.  
 
Navigability Cues and Associated Heuristics 
 
Because digital media are distinct from traditional print, audio, or visual media in their ability 
to transmit information, the need to follow a linear style does not apply to online content. 
Website layouts, social media platforms, and other online contexts allow users to ‘navigate’ to 
different points on the Web at their leisure, making for an information consumption process 
that follows a non-linear trajectory. The functions through which navigability manifests can 
serve as cues that influence the degree to which the quality and credibility of online content is 
positively or negatively assessed. Although the computer-mediated communication literature 
identifies several heuristics associated with navigability cues, Table 4 summarises the two most 
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salient for the dissemination of counternarratives: the elaboration heuristic and the scaffolding 
heuristic. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Summary of Cues and Heuristics 
 
It is critical to recognise that the cues and heuristics summarised in Tables 1-4 do not operate 
in isolation, nor do they all apply in every online context. Some heuristics may be triggered in 
response to one online message, but not for another. Therefore, this list of heuristics and their 
predicted effects should not be considered the final word on psychological responses to online 
content. However, they do provide a useful starting point for thinking about content, sourcing, 
and online structural characteristics that might improve the degree to which targets of 
counternarratives can come to trust their sources. Consistent with the work of Braddock and 
Horgan,41 these cues and heuristics can be used to derive a set of preliminary guidelines for 
cultivating trust in counternarrative messages and sources. The following section draws on the 
MAIN Model and its components as summarised in Tables 1-4 to offer such guidelines. 
 
Preliminary Guidelines for Cultivating Trust in  
Counternarrative Messages and Sources 
 
This section offers a set of recommendations—respectively related to modality cues, agency 
cues, interactivity cues, and navigability cues—to assist in the cultivation of trust in developing 
and distributing online counternarratives intended to reduce support for terrorism. These 
guidelines are sufficiently broad as to facilitate their application across a range of contexts. 
However, it is essential that individual counternarratives be tailored to the specific context in 
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which they are applied. 42  This means that although authors and distributors of 
counternarratives can effectively apply these guidelines, they must also consider the timing of 
their dissemination, the type of terrorist group (and ideology) being challenged, the internal 
dynamics of the terrorist group being targeted, and other related issues. 
  
Modality Cues 
 
Realism Heuristic 
 
Because terrorist narratives often attempt to persuade individuals to support the group through 
idealised depictions of engagement, it is important for counternarratives to provide realistic 
challenges against those depictions. Therefore, counternarratives should be presented via 
media (or combinations of media) that can vividly portray the negative real-life experience of 
terrorist engagement, many of which have been documented in interviews with former 
terrorists.43 Many former terrorists have expressed significant disillusionment related to their 
involvement in terrorism. For instance, Horgan has interviewed many former terrorists who 
have described vast differences between their expectations and the realities of engagement.44 
These interviewees have described situations in which they have been disappointed by their 
superiors, grew lonely for their families, or simply became bored from the tedium of day-to-
day involvement with the group. Authors of counternarratives can use these stories of 
disillusionment to challenge terrorist narratives. Moreover, by supplementing traditional text 
with audio, visual, or audio-visual cues, authors of counternarratives can (a) promote 
transportation into counternarratives, which is often a precursor to successful persuasion,45 and 
(b) bolster the credibility of the messages contained therein by increasing the realism of the 
counternarrative.  
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Modality Recommendation 1: Use multiple modalities (i.e., text, audio, and video) 
simultaneously to present online counternarratives that depict disappointing realities of 
involvement in terrorism. 
 
Old Media Heuristic 
 
The old media heuristic proposes that content presented as if it were in a newspaper is likely 
to be deemed credible. However, when deciding on the format with which to present a 
counternarrative, its author must first consider which formats and sources of information would 
be most credible to the target audience.  Because counternarratives should be tailored to contain 
information that contradicts or discredits terrorist narratives,46 there is no guarantee that a 
counternarrative should contain information that would lend itself to being reported in a 
newspaper. As such, counternarratives presented as ‘old media’ will not necessarily prompt 
perceptions of credibility towards the counternarrative’s content or source.  
 
Moreover, in an era in which many individuals doubt the truthfulness of the news produced by 
media outlets,47 it is altogether possible that counternarrative targets will consider information 
presented via traditional media as untrustworthy. For example, there is evidence to suggest that 
individuals of different age groups attribute credibility to different source types; in certain 
cases, newspaper content is not judged as most credible.48 Taken together, these factors suggest 
that authors and distributors of counternarratives should avoid wholesale adherence to a 
strategy of presenting messages as if they were in old media. Audience analysis techniques 
should be undertaken to determine whether and the degree to which audience members would 
attribute credibility to these classic gatekeepers of information. 
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Modality Recommendation 2: Present online counternarrative content as if it were from an 
official news source (e.g., a news reporting agency) only if an analysis of the audience indicates 
trust in old media sources.  
 
Being-There Heuristic 
 
Because immersion facilitates persuasion among audience members, 49 it is imperative for 
counternarratives to effectively discredit or replace terrorist groups’ immersive depictions of 
reality. To effectively counter terrorist groups’ immersive narratives, 50 it is necessary to 
provide a similarly immersive counternarrative that highlights the group’s ideological, 
strategic, and tactical hypocrisies,51 as well as the mistreatment of group members and rival 
factions. This can be achieved with counternarratives that employ vivid language, characters 
that are similar to audience members, and visual material that can intensify audience members’ 
potential transportation into the counternarrative. Triggering the being-there heuristic in this 
manner can garner moralistic, functional, and societal distrust in the group, their depiction of 
‘reality’, and the organisational morality of the group.  By activating the being-there heuristic, 
authors of counternarratives can challenge what may initially appear to be a credible depiction 
of terrorist reality through vivid portrayals of the negative realities associated with engagement 
in terrorism (much like the realism heuristic).  
 
Modality Recommendation 3: Use vivid language, characters similar to the target audience, 
and supplementary visual material to intensify audience immersion into counternarratives.  
 
Distraction Heuristic 
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A comprehensive counter-messaging operation is likely to be comprised of multiple 
counternarratives spread across various modalities. As such, there is considerable risk for 
counternarrative authors to present a splintered message if the themes in the various 
counternarratives are not consistent. Therefore, it is important that counternarratives targeted 
at a particular audience are consistent across modalities in terms of the themes they promote 
so as not to distract the target audience from the counternarratives’ central purpose(s). In 
addition, the messages presented via multiple modalities should be sufficiently easy to process 
so as not to require significant cognitive effort to interpret.  
 
Modality Recommendation 4: Facilitate counternarrative processing by ensuring that the 
central counternarrative themes presented across multiple modalities are clear and consistent. 
 
Intrusiveness Heuristic 
 
Although new and emergent digital technologies afford counternarrative authors and analysts 
a wide array of modalities for disseminating counternarratives, some of these may not be 
optimal for disseminating counternarratives. To this point, the use of an invasive modality (e.g., 
pop-ups, unsolicited videos) for counternarrative dissemination is strongly discouraged, as 
perceptions of intrusiveness are likely to yield negative judgements of the message’s quality 
and credibility. Although intrusive forms of communication may result in a greater number of 
people seeing a counternarrative, its presentation is likely to annoy a significant number of 
counternarrative targets. This annoyance is likely to cause individuals to dismiss the message, 
or worse, induce a boomerang persuasive effect.52 
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Modality Recommendation 5: Avoid distributing counternarratives with intrusive 
communicative tools that present unexpected or unsolicited content.  
 
Agency Cues 
Machine Heuristic 
 
If information is presented such that it is evident that a non-human entity selected and 
distributed the information, it may be perceived as objectively selected, and therefore, more 
credible. This is particularly true if the information in the message is factual (rather than 
socioemotional) in kind. Therefore, if a counternarrative contains informational content 
relating to the terrorist group, politics, or violent activities, it may be useful to present the 
counternarrative as if it were objectively selected for presentation, possibly by computer 
algorithm. The machine heuristic dictates that doing so can heighten trust in the 
counternarrative’s content and source, while also fostering distrust of the terrorist group’s 
subjective selection of the information they present. If, however, a counternarrative contains 
content intended to challenge ideological or emotional arguments, the credibility of that 
counternarrative may not be aided by presenting it in such a manner. 
 
Agency Recommendation 1a: If counternarrative content is primarily factual in kind, present 
the counternarrative as if it were objectively selected by a machine algorithm (e.g., Facebook 
‘newsfeed’). 
 
Agency Recommendation 1b: If counternarrative content is primarily emotional or ideological 
in kind, do not present the counternarrative as if it were objectively selected by machine 
algorithm. 
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Bandwagon Heuristic 
 
Terrorism researchers have found that individuals often choose to engage in violence as a 
function of the support received from family members or close friends.53 This is unsurprising; 
individuals often turn to their peers to make judgments about how to process and act on 
information. Luckily, this tendency can also be leveraged in the development and 
dissemination of counternarratives intended to dissuade individuals from engaging in 
terrorism. Specifically, counternarratives that are endorsed by (or presented as if they are 
endorsed by) individuals that target audiences would perceive as similar to themselves are 
likely to be judged as credible by those target audiences. As such, having the perceived peers 
of target audiences distribute (or endorse) counternarratives may render them more credible, 
and therefore cultivate greater trust in the counternarrative content. 
 
Agency Recommendation 2a: Recruit peers of target audiences to assist in the presentation or 
endorsement of counternarratives. 
 
Agency Recommendation 2b: Present counternarratives in contexts that suggest peer 
endorsement. 
 
Authority Heuristic 
 
Messages (including narratives and counternarratives) are likely to be deemed credible if they 
are perceived as coming from a trusted expert or authority figure on the topic. Therefore, 
consistent with Braddock and Horgan,54 it is likely that the most effective counternarratives 
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will come from ideological leaders, former members, or other authority figures within a 
specific movement. Alternatively, counternarratives can also be framed as being about these 
individuals and their negative experiences with the terrorist group. This allows the target 
audience to receive an alternative interpretation of a terrorist group, its action, and its ideology 
from an individual or organisation representing the same community and with expertise derived 
from their experiences within the group. To this end, former members of terrorist groups,55 
members of a community that a terrorist group claims to represent,56 and ideological leaders 
with an interest in challenging terrorist messaging57 can wield significant influence over those 
at risk for violent radicalisation. It follows that counternarratives presented (or framed as 
presented) by one of these authorities may be effective in challenging terrorist narratives. This 
was one of the key areas where ‘Think Again, Turn Away,’ struggled. By being officially 
connected to Department of State the messages were not perceived as coming from a trusted 
source by the target audience. 
 
Agency Recommendation 3: Recruit authority figures (e.g., former members of terrorist 
groups, community members, ideological leaders) to distribute counternarratives. 
 
Social Presence Heuristic 
 
Online socioemotional content that explicitly promotes feelings of camaraderie and connection 
with other web users is qualitatively different than content that appears to be informational in 
kind. So, in contrast to the machine heuristic, which suggests that objective selection of 
counternarratives would be useful if the counternarrative content is factual in kind, the social 
presence heuristic dictates that counternarratives primarily comprised of socioemotional 
content be presented as if they were chosen by a person. This allows the recipient of the 
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counternarrative to develop a feeling of association with the counternarrative’s author, perhaps 
to the point of feeling a sense of sympathy or camaraderie. If socioemotional content relating 
to negative experiences or interpretations of the terrorist group’s ideology is presented by an 
individual (rather than a machine), the content and source are more likely to be considered 
credible and trustworthy. In contrast (and as argued in Agency Recommendation 1b), 
socioemotional content that is presented as if it were selected by a machine is likely to be 
dismissed. 
 
Agency Recommendation 4: Emphasize the humanity of the source of counternarratives 
comprised of socioemotional or ideological content (particularly if the source is similar to the 
intended audience). 
 
Interactivity Cues 
Activity Heuristic 
 
Although all the heuristics presented in this paper require a consideration of context when 
disseminating counternarratives, it is particularly true when triggering the activity heuristic. 
Mood management theory suggests that individuals seek out media that will help them develop 
or maintain a positive mood.58 For example, when a user is bored, a higher level of activity 
may trigger positive judgments about the interface with which he/she is engaging. However, 
because counternarratives (a) are likely to depict serious content, and (b) require a measure of 
focus to trigger the identification, transportation, and parasocial interaction processes that make 
them persuasive,59 it follows that too much activity on the part of the user would detract not 
only from the counternarrative’s credibility, but also the likelihood of it even being seen. 
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Therefore, it may be useful for counternarratives to be disseminated via interfaces that do not 
require substantial activity on the part of the user.  
 
Interactivity Recommendation 1: Limit the amount of user activity needed to consume 
counternarrative content (e.g., ‘slideshows’ that require constant clicking to navigate). 
 
Interaction Heuristic 
 
When a counternarrative is presented in an interface that has been tailored by the recipient, it 
is likely that the counternarrative is likely to be deemed credible. After all, if the user tailored 
the online interface to his/her preferences, the information presented in that interface are likely 
to be perceived as being selected by the user him/herself. In this way, counternarratives 
presented in online contexts that facilitate interaction may be deemed more credible and 
trustworthy. It is important to note that this proposal is not contradictory to predictions 
associated with the activity heuristic. Whereas the activity heuristic relates to the 
counternarrative itself, the interaction heuristic relates to the interface on which it is presented. 
This has significant implications for counternarrative strategies employed on Web 2.0 
platforms like Facebook or Twitter.  
 
Interactivity Recommendation 2: Present counternarratives in a manner consistent with 
preferences solicited by the user via the online interface. 
 
Choice Heuristic 
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A well-organized online interface is likely to be perceived as more credible than a disorganized 
one. As a result, counternarratives should be presented in a well-organized online interface that 
provides audiences with choices about which content to engage with (via a drop-down menu, 
for example). Counternarratives presented via online interfaces that are disorganized are likely 
to have two negative implications. First, the disorganization will make it difficult for the user 
to find and engage with counternarrative content. Second, a disorganized interface that 
provides the user with choices about what content to engage with is likely to be perceived as 
unreliable, given that the information will be scattered and messily structured.  
 
Interactivity Recommendation 3a: When information in an online interface is well-organized, 
provide the target audience with specific choices about what counternarrative content to 
engage with. 
 
Interactivity Recommendation 3b: When information in an online interface is not well-
organized, do not provide the target audience with specific choices about what 
counternarrative content to engage with. 
 
Control Heuristic 
 
New digital technologies allow information to be presented in a variety of ways. In some cases, 
the manner in which information is presented does not afford users the time or capacity to 
engage with the content, thereby reducing its impact (e.g., stories that automatically scroll 
across the interface). Counternarratives should be presented in such a way that users are 
afforded the control over the temporal and structural elements of the interface in which they 
appear. Because the efficacy of counternarratives is at least partially contingent on the 
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systematic processing of the information found within,60 it follows that an interface that allows 
for user control over how information is presented would improve user perceptions of the 
counternarrative’s (and its source’s) credibility.  
 
Interactivity Recommendation 4: When a counternarrative contains sufficient information that 
the online interface must ‘scroll’ through the content, provide the user with the capacity to 
control the speed and manner with which the counternarrative is revealed. 
 
Contingency Heuristic 
 
Thus far, our discussion of interactivity has focused exclusively on user interactions with 
media. However, interactivity does not relate only to interaction with a communication 
medium; it is also important for counternarrative authors to consider how the online platforms 
in which counternarratives are presented facilitate interaction with other individuals. As such, 
an effective counternarrative strategy should make use of interfaces that facilitate person-to-
person interaction. This is particularly applicable for counternarratives hosted on Web 2.0 
platforms. This interactivity will promote perceptions of authority and reliability among users 
(regarding their perceived communicative partners). This, in turn, can improve the credibility 
of counternarrative content, thereby making it more persuasive. 
 
Interactivity Recommendation 5: Distribute counternarratives in interfaces within which users 
can communicate with one another, particularly if some users are already (a) respected 
authorities within the online community, and/or (b) sympathetic to the counternarratives’ 
goals. 
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Navigability Cues 
Elaboration Heuristic 
 
When triggered, the ‘elaboration heuristic’ gives users the impression of comprehensiveness—
that the information presented is complete and thorough.61 Information perceived as thorough 
is typically considered credible. Moreover, because counternarratives are most optimally 
presented as part of larger, wide-ranging counter-messaging campaigns, comprehensive 
information related to counternarrative content may help audiences contextualise and interpret 
that content. When presented in isolation, counternarratives may be interpreted devoid of 
context, leaving it susceptible to misinterpretation. In this vein, counternarratives are likely to 
be most effective when they are presented via an online interface or platform that facilitates 
access to complementary information related to the counternarrative content. The elaboration 
heuristic dictates that this will improve perceptions of the content’s quality, and therefore, 
improve judgments of the counternarrative author’s credibility among message targets. 
 
Navigability Recommendation 1: When counternarratives are part of a larger counter-
messaging strategy, facilitate user navigation to information that complements the themes that 
comprise the counternarrative. 
 
Scaffolding Heuristic 
 
It is sometimes advisable for web designers to direct users to certain parts of websites over 
others. For instance, some designers may present clickable links in an organized hierarchy, 
with larger links being representative of more important information.62 The gratitude felt by 
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users for this guidance is likely to yield perceptions of content quality and source credibility. 
Given this, it is likely that presenting counternarratives hierarchically—whether on a traditional 
website or Web 2.0 interfaces—will improve audience perceptions of the counternarrative’s 
(and its source’s) credibility.63 
 
Navigability Recommendation 2: Present online counternarratives hierarchically such that 
users are clearly directed to content that is most salient.  
 
Moving Forward 
 
Empirical Testing of Guidelines for Disseminating Online Counternarratives 
 
As emphasised above, the guidelines proposed here are not meant to be the final word on the 
presentation of online counternarratives. They should instead be interpreted as viable starting 
points for empirical work that evaluates (a) how and when these cues and heuristics operate, 
(b) how the heuristics interact, and (c) which heuristics are most potent in response to terrorist 
narratives and counternarratives. To this end, there are several avenues of future research 
related to these cues and heuristics that would be useful for guiding the dissemination of online 
counternarratives. 
 
First, terrorism researchers should strive to test these heuristics in relation to counternarratives 
via experimental methods. Research on computer-mediated communication practices have 
long-used experimental manipulations to test the psychological effects of Web-based structural 
elements and the content contained therein. Terrorism researchers should follow suit. For 
example, the contingency heuristic dictates that counternarratives may be judged as credible to 
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the degree that they are presented in an online interface that allows for person-to-person 
interaction. Future researchers could test this prediction by manipulating the interactive 
features on Web-based platforms.  
 
Another example would be to experimentally test the interaction between counternarrative 
content and heuristic triggers. For instance, informational content or socioemotional content 
should be judged as more credible if a message’s author is able to respectively trigger the 
machine heuristic or social presence heuristic. Terrorism researchers should test this possibility 
with terrorist narratives and counternarratives, two kinds of value-laden communication that 
may not yield the same results as more traditional kinds of Web content. Morrison and 
Braddock64 have begun work to this effect, but the sheer number of cues and heuristics that 
require investigation leaves room for a substantial amount of future work in this domain.  
 
Second, future researchers may benefit from exploring how these heuristics are triggered via 
different kinds of digital interfaces. The proliferation of Web 2.0 social media platforms has 
fundamentally changed the way we consume information. Many of Sundar’s65 heuristics are 
geared towards explaining psychological reactions to more traditional, static Web content, but 
for those that seek to effectively challenge the narratives of today’s media-savvy terrorist 
groups, it is necessary to utilize equally dynamic methods of counternarrative delivery. To this 
end, it would be useful to experimentally test the potency of the MAIN Model’s cues and 
heuristics in response to counternarratives delivered via not only traditional social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter, but also more unorthodox platforms like Instagram and 
Snapchat (both of which allow for user presentation of ‘stories’ through a series of images or 
video), as well as direct messaging programs (e.g., Telegram66) that terrorist groups have come 
to exploit. 
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Finally, future scholarship would benefit from exploring how the cues and heuristics outlined 
in this paper interact with other theories of persuasion. For instance, some of the heuristics 
(e.g., the being-there heuristic, the realism heuristic) relate to audience immersion in online 
content. Related to this, there is a substantial amount of extant work to show psychological 
transportation, identification with narrative characters, and parasocial interaction to be 
mediators of the relationship between exposure to a message and persuasion. Given this, it may 
be useful to explore the degree to which some of the heuristics affect these precursors to 
persuasion.  
 
Putting the Guidelines into Practice 
 
In addition to the aforementioned avenues of future scholarship, this paper also has 
implications for the future development and distribution of counternarratives in practice. First, 
although the cues and heuristics discussed here were originally described in relation to 
traditional computer-mediated platforms, they also apply to the digital communication 
technologies that have since emerged. As such, the psychological effects associated with these 
heuristics can be exploited through the dissemination of counternarratives via these new digital 
channels (e.g., Telegram, WhatsApp, mobile-exclusive social media). Analysts have certainly 
attempted to challenge terrorist propaganda via these channels, but it is unlikely that 
counternarrative content has been tailored to match the psychological effects of the heuristics 
prompted by the channels’ affordances. To cultivate trust in counternarrative content (and 
sources), analysts and policymakers should consider how communicative affordances are 
manifest in new digital technologies and whether their counternarratives—if presented via 
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these technologies—effectively cue positive judgments from intended audiences per the 
guidelines above. 
 
Second, as argued by Braddock and Horgan,67 the effective distribution of counter-narratives 
requires close coordination between developers of counternarratives and trusted leaders in the 
communities in which they are to be disseminated. The authors contended that former members 
of terrorist groups or members of the community the group purports to defend make promising 
conduits through which counternarratives can be disseminated. Many of the heuristics 
described above reiterate the importance of these kinds of individuals. By presenting online 
counternarratives via trusted sources, practitioners can take full advantages of these heuristics 
(e.g., the authority heuristic) to foster trust in counternarrative content. 
 
Finally, many of the cues and heuristics described in this paper are based on message delivery 
methods that transcend traditional text, graphics, or multimedia content. For instance, our 
interactivity-based recommendations are largely based on dynamic user engagement with 
counternarrative content (e.g., inputting preferences for message presentation) and the 
seamless presentation of that content in response to user actions. Cultivating trust in online 
counternarratives presented using these innovative communication tools requires expertise in 
platform development, coding, and web design. Therefore, practitioners charged with 
developing and distributing online counternarratives should coordinate with web designers, 
coders, and programmers that can translate counternarrative content into vibrant, engaging 
stories amenable to presentation via new digital platforms. For instance, in cooperation with 
experts on virtual reality platforms and programming, Braddock is currently testing the efficacy 
of counternarratives presented in simulated reality environments.68 As methods for delivering 
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online counternarratives grow more technologically intricate, partnerships between counter-
terror researchers, practitioners, and programming experts will become critical. 
 
Closing Remarks 
 
When effective, counternarratives are transformative at multiple levels. They can change 
audience perceptions of a terrorist group, make the group’s members reconsider the validity of 
its ideology, or even demonstrate the faults in the group’s actions. They can play a significant 
role in pushing an individual to abandon terrorist beliefs, attitudes, or behaviour, or prevent a 
curious individual from engaging in the first place. The transformative power of 
counternarratives, however, is contingent not only on what the counternarrative says, but how 
the counternarrative’s source is perceived by target audiences. The failure of the ill-fated 
‘Think Again, Turn Away’ programme is illustrative of this fact. Although the messages that 
were distributed as part of the programme may have been accurate, the sources attached to 
those messages were not trusted by their intended targets. As a result, the messages were 
rejected, and any persuasive effectiveness they might have had was rendered moot. 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a set of preliminary guidelines for overcoming 
barriers to persuasion experienced by programs like ‘Think Again, Turn Away’ by making 
counternarratives more credible and increasing audience trust in a counternarrative’s source—
a necessary precondition of counternarrative effectiveness.69  The emerging literature on the 
role of trust within the psychology of terrorist decision-making demonstrates that trust in a 
message’s source has the potential to outweigh any action or ideology. In short, trust and 
distrust play significant roles in the decision-making processes leading a person to initially join 
(or ultimately leave) a terrorist group. 70  Therefore, both the content and the sources of 
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counternarratives designed to deter support for terrorism must be perceived as credible if the 
messages are to be effective. The guidelines presented here can help researchers, practitioners, 
and policymakers achieve this critical goal with counternarratives intended to reduce support 
for terrorism.  
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